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ICTENSEV v. THE MINISTER OF EMPLOYMENT AND
IMMIGRATION
Michael Bossin*
An unfortunate series of events lead to the illegal detention of Ethem
Ictensev. He was detained in jail for a period of more than two years
until his release was ordered by a judge of the Supreme Court of On-
tario.1
Ethem Ictensev is a citizen of Turkey, who arrived in Canada on
August 1st, 1986. He claimed refugee status. A report was then written,
pursuant to Section 20 of the Immigration Act2, as Mr. Ictensev had ar-
rived in Canada without the proper visa. He was told to report for his
inquiry on September 9th, 1986. Until then, he was free to remain at
large in the community, out of custody.
On September 9th, Ethem Ictensev came to his inquiry without coun-
sel. A Turkish interpreter was present, as Mr. Ictensev spoke only
limited English. The inquiry commenced but did not proceed. The ad-
judicator was not satisfied that Mr. Ictensev had been advised of his
right to counsel prior to the hearing. In such circumstances, Section
27(3) of the Immigration Regulations, 1978 requires the adjudicator to
adjourn.3
After announcing her decision to adjourn, the adjudicator asked the
case presenting officer, who represents the Minister of Employment
and Immigration at such hearings, if she was content with Mr.
Ictensev's continued release. The officer requested a recess before
responding, and this request was granted.
During the recess, the case presenting officer questioned Mr. Ictensev
about a number of things, including his experiences in Turkey. This
occurred in spite of the fact that it had just been determined that Mr.
Ictensev had not been advised of his right to counsel. The questioning
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1. Ictensev v. The Minister of Employment and Immigation (1988) 7 Imm.L.R. (2nd)
306 (S.C.O.) [hereinafter Ictensev].
2. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2.
3. SOR/78-172.
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took place in the absence of counsel.
After the recess, the case presenting officer stated that she was not content
with Mr. Ictensev's continued release. She then proceeded to make a
lengthy submission, which included information obtained from Mr. Ic-
tensev, during the recess, to the effect that he should be detained.
After hearing the officer's submissions, the adjudicator advised Mr. Ic-
tensev that she had to decide whether she ought to continue his
release or order his detention. She then stated:
"Now you still have not been advised of your right to be repre-
sented by counsel at this inquiry. You have the right to be repre-
sented by a counsel. Such a counsel can be a lawyer or any other
person, and you don't have to say anything at this inquiry until you
have an opportunity to consult a counsel However, if you wish to
address the issue of your detention or your release you may do so
at this time. Is there anything you would like to say?" 3a
Mr. Ictensev responded that he did not want to get a lawyer or counsel
at the moment, but would like to answer right then. The adjudicator
then advised Mr. Ictensev that she had some questions for him. She
indicated that if he did not wish to respond to the questions without
counsel, that was his right, but that she was very concerned about his
being a danger to the public. She then proceeded to question Mr. Ic-
tensev, which questioning covered seven pages of the transcript of the
hearing.
At the conclusion of the adjudicator's questions, Mr. Ictensev stated,
"after answering all these questions by myself now, do I have a right
to get a counsellor?" The adjudicator replied, "you have a right to get a
counsel at any stage of the proceedings, Mr. Ictensev. Please proceed,
Mrs. N. (the case presenting officer)." The case presenting officer then
proceeded to question Mr. Ictensev for five pages of the transcript.
In the end, Mr. Ictensev was ordered detained pursuant to s.103(3) of
the Immigration Act.4 Under this section, where an inquiry is to be held
or continued with respect to a person, an adjudicator may make an
order for the detention of the person where, in his opinion, the person
poses a danger to the public or would not otherwise appear for the in-
quiry or continuation thereof. Mr. Ictensev was ordered detained for
both reasons.
3a. Transcript of the Inquiry for Mr. Ictensev.
4. Supra, note 2.
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It is clear from a reading of the transcript of the inquiry, on Septem-
ber 9, 1986, that the adjudicator was not satisfied with the interpreter's
performance. For example, she expressed doubt as to whether he was
translating accurately; had to request him to translate certain portions
of the proceedings; had to remind him to translate exactly what she
said and not as he wished; suggested that discrepancies in the
evidence might be attributed to the interpreter, had to stop the inquiry
to ask whether the interpreter was correctly interpreting; and had to
ask the interpreter to use the exact language that Mr. Ictensev was
using. Furthermore, the interpreter at times spoke in the third person
when translating Mr. Ictensev's words, admitted that he had not trans-
lated one of the adjudicator's questions to Mr. Ictensev as asked, and
occasionally could not hear what was said.
Under the provisions of the Immigration Act, an adjudicator was re-
quired to review Mr. Ictensev's detention every seven days. This was
done, but on each occasion, the adjudicator referred to statements
made by Mr. Ictensev on September 9th, 1986, and on such basis or-
dered his continued detention. At a number of these detention reviews,
Mr. Ictensev was represented by counsel.
In the fall of 1988, an application for habeus corpus ad subjiciendum
with certiorari in aid was brought in the Supreme Court of Ontario. It
was argued that at this inquiry on September 9th, 1986, Mr. Ictensev's
rights had been violated, pursuant to the Charter of Rights5 and the
Immigration Act, and that this initial proceeding had tainted all sub-
sequent detention reviews. It was submitted that Mr. Ictensev's deten-
tion was illegal and he should therefore be released immediately. In
his decision Mr. Justice McKeown accepted all of these arguments,
and the application was successful. After more than two years of il-
legal detention, Mr. Ictensev was ordered released from jail.
The Ictensev decision itself is not lengthy. However, from a legal
perspective, the decision is interesting for two reasons: one's right to
an interpreter, and one's right to counsel.
Both the Charter and the Canadian Bill of Rights6 deal with the right to
the assistance of an interpreter. Section 14 of the Charter states that "a
party or witness in any proceedings who does not understand or speak
5. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.l1 (hereinafter the
Charter).
6. S.C. 1960, c. 44 (R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III).
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the language in which the proceedings are conducted or who is deaf
has the right to the assistance of an interpreter".7 Section 2(g) of the
Canadian Bill of Rights is similarly worded.8 Furthermore, section
27(2)(c) of the Immigration Regulations, 1978 requires adjudicators to
satisfy themselves that the person concerned is able to understand and
communicate in the language in which the inquiry is being held.9
Where the adjudicator is not satisfied, the inquiry should be ad-
journed to enable the case presenting officer to obtain the services of
an interpreter.10 Where an interpreter is required, he or she must
swear an oath to translate accurately to the best of his or her ability all
the questions asked, answers given and statements made at the in-
quiry.11
The leading case concerning one's right to the assistance of an inter-
preter is a 1974 Supreme Court of Canada decision, 1. v. Reale 12
Throughout his trial for noncapital murder, Mr. Reale had the services
of an interpreter. Interpretation was provided for the final jury addres-
ses of both Crown and defence counsel. However, when it came to his
charge to the jury, the trial judge dispensed with the interpreter be-
cause he felt that interpretation at this .stage might distract the jury.
The majority of the Supreme Court found that this ruling resulted in a
violation of Section 2(g) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.13 Further, Sec-
tion 577(1) (now Section 650) of the Criminal Code provides that "an
accused other than a corporation shall be present in court during the
course of his trial".14 According to Reale, without an interpreter assist-
ing him at "every" stage of the proceeding, the accused person in a
criminal proceeding is effectively not present, which is his right. 15
The Court of Appeal, in its reasoning in Reale, related one's right to
an interpreter to the concept of equality. 16
7. Supra, note 5.
8. Supra, note 6.
9. Supra, note 3.
10. Ahid. at s.27(3).
11. Ibid. at s.28(b).
12. (1975), 22 C.C.C.(2d) 571 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Reatel.
13. Supra, note 6.
14. R.S.C.-1985 c. C-46.
15. Supra, note 12.
16. (1974), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 345 (Ont.C.A.).
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The Court of Appeal wrote:
"An accused who is unable to understand what is being said during
an essential part of the trial by reason of his inability to understand
the language in which the trial is conducted can scarcely be said to
stand on the same footing or in an equal position with respect to
the application of the criminal law as others who are subject to its
process." 17
Similarly, reading Section 14 of the Charter in conjunction with Sec-
tion 15, one can say that without the full assistance of an interpreter,
persons requiring such assistance are not equal before the law with
those for whom such assistance is not required.18
In Weber v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, the Federal Court of
Appeal held that "since the rights of an individual are ... at issue, the
reasoning in the Reale case (was) applicable in an (immigration) in-
quiry."19 In Weber, the evidence of one of the witnesses called by the
person concerned had not been translated to such person. To rectify
this error, the special inquiry officer (adjudicator) provided a summary
of the evidence, which was duly translated. This evidence, clearly, was
irrelevant to the allegation being made against the person concerned
and presumably would have had no effect whatsoever on the decision
made at the inquiry. In a review of the decision, the Federal Court of
Appeal held that the "failure to interpret verbatim the testimony of a
witness called on her behalf, deprived the Applicant of her fundamen-
tal right to know what was being said in an essential part of the
Inquiry" (emphasis added).20 Moreover, the special inquiry officer's at-
tempt to correct this failure by summarizing the evidence did not cure
theherror. 'The Applicant," said the Court, "was entitled to know ex-
actly what was said ... "21
Weber goes far in establishing the extent of one's right to the assistance
of an interpreter. In Faiva v. The Minister of Employment and Immigra-
tion, the Federal Court of Appeal goes even further in demonstrating
how almost absolute this right is, in the context of an immigration
17. Supra, note 16 at 348-9.
18. Supra, note 5.
19. (1977), 13 N.R. 495 at 500 (Fed.CA.) [hereinafter Weber].
20. Ibid. at 500.
21. Ibid
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hearing.22 In this case, the applicant was from Tonga, and spoke the
Tongan language. The inquiry was adjourned so that a Tongan inter-
preter could be found. However, none could be found. After a number
of adjournments, the case presenting officer informed the adjudicator
that every possible effort to find an interpreter who could speak Ton-
gan had been made but they had been unsuccessful. The adjudicator
was faced with a dilemma. He had a responsibility to conduct the in-
quiry, but he also was required to provide the person concerned with
an interpreter.
In the end, the adjudicator decided to "relax somewhat the require-
ments concerning a person concerned's ability to understand and
communicate," and proceeded with the inquiry in English.23 He found
that Mr. Faiva had remained in Canada after he had ceased to be a
visitor, and ordered his removal. In his decision, the adjudicator stated
that "I am satisfied from your testimony that your command of the
English language is and has been sufficient for you to effectively com-
municate at this inquiry and to understand the questions put to you
and all other matters at this inquiry."24 In spite of this, the Federal
Court of Appeal overturned the decision. The Court held that the
adjudicator's "duty to conduct an inquiry was subject to the require-
ment that an interpreter be provided.... If an interpreter was required,
which was clearly (the adjudicator's) opinion, and could not be
provided, he no longer had a duty to proceed with the inquiry. He did
not have the right to do so."25
Mr. Justice McKeown cited Faiva in deciding Ictensev. However he
went one step further by stating "once the adjudicator decided that the
interpreter was unsatisfactory, she should have adjourned the in-
quiry.' 26 Furthermore, 'the right to the assistance of an interpreter
means the right to the assistance of a competent interpreter. Mr. Justice
MeKeown states that s.14 of the Charter can only be interpreted as
meaning a qualified interpreter."27 This may seem trite, but such judi-
22. (1983), 47 N.R. 225 (Fed.C.A.) [hereinafter Faival.
23. Supra, note 22 at 228.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ictensev, supra, note 1 at 1.
27. Ibid.
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cial statements are clearly helpful in situations where one has the
slightest doubt about the ability of an interpreter. One's right to have
every word spoken at a hearing translated accurately and competently
is well supported by Canadian case law.
One final word with respect to interpretation: all of the rights as-
sociated with interpretation into English or French apply equally to
those whose need for an interpreter is the result of a hearing impair-
ment. In the recent case of Murphy v. Dodd,28 the Court of Appeal
overturned an injunction against a deaf woman on the grounds that
the notice of proceedings had not properly been interpreted to Ms.
Dodd. Query whether a similar ruling would be made where the
respondent/defendant requires an interpreter because of his or her
lack of fluency in English or French?
A number of issues arose in Ictensev concerning Mr. Ictensev's right to
counsel. Section 10(b) of the Charter provides that "everyone has the
right on arrest or detention to retain and instruct counsel without
delay and to be informed of that right. ' 29 Was Mr. Ictensev detained?
Clearly, he had not been arrested when the adjudicator announced
that she had to "decide whether (she) ought to continue (his) release or
... order (his) detention."29a Support for the notion that Mr. Ictensev
was "detained" at this point can be found in R v. Therens, a decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada.30 In that decision, Mr. Justice Le
Dain considered the meaning of detention. He writes:
"[Section] 10 of the Charter is directed to a restraint of liberty other
than arrest in which a person might reasonably require the assis-
tance of counsel but might be prevented or impeded from retaining
and instructing counsel without delay but for the constitutional
guarantee."31
Mr. Justice Le Dain continues:
"There can be no doubt that there must be some form of compul-
sion or coercion to constitute an interference with liberty or
freedom of action that amounts to a detention within the meaning
28. (11 July 1989), No. 1566/89 (S.C.O.).
29. Supra. note 5.
29a Supra, note 3a.
30. (1985) 18 D.L.R. (4th) 655 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Therensj.
31. Ibid. at 678.
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of s.10 of the Charter. The issue, as I see it, is whether that compul-
sion need be of a physical character, or whether it may also be a com-
pulsion of a psychological or mental nature which inhibits the will as
effectively as the application, or threat of application, of physical force.
The issue is whether a person who is the subject of a demand or direc-
tion by a police officer or other agent of the State may reasonably
regard himself or herself as free to refuse to comply."32
In considering whether it would be reasonable for a person to regard
himself or herself as free to refuse to comply, the Mr. Justice Le Dain
allowed that one's perception of such freedom would be of greater
relevance than the precise legal limits of the State's authority to detain,
of which most citizens would not be aware.
'The element of psychological compulsion, in the form of a
reasonable perception of suspension of freedom of choice, is
enough to make the restraint of liberty involuntary. Detention may
be effected without the application or threat of application of physi-
cal restraint if the person concerned submits or acquiesces in the
deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes that the choice to do
otherwise does not exist."33
In the context of an immigration inquiry, where the person concerned
is probably a newcomer to Canada, may speak little English and is
generally in a state of some anxiety, such a definition of detention is
extremely important. Like Mr. Ictensev, most persons in such a situa-
tion will feel compelled to remain at the inquiry. It is unlikely that
many will believe that they can simply leave the proceedings whenever
they wish.
As a rule, immigration officers deny recent arrivals to Canada access
to counsel when such persons are being questioned at the point of
entry. Again, one's ability in English or French as well as one's level
of anxiety would contribute to one's mental state at this time. State-
ments made to immigration officers in such circumstances are in-
variably recorded, and may be used against the person concerned at a
later date. Therens and Ictensev certainly support the view that at this
stage, those persons held by immigration authorities should be made
aware of their right to counsel. Furthermore, according to the Supreme
32. Supra, note 30 at 678.
33. 1bid. at 680.
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Court of Canada in K v. Manninen, detainees must be provided with a
reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct counsel without delay.34
Simply advising one of his or her rights at this point is not enough to
satisfy the provisions of Section 10(b) of the Charter.35
Finally, a waiver of one's right to counsel should not be treated lightly,
as it was in Ictensev. In the words of Madame Justice Wilson in R v.
Clarkson:36
"ITihis court (Supreme Court of Canada) stated with respect to the
waiver of statutory procedural guarantees in R v. Korponary, [1982 1
S.C.R 41; ... at p. 49, that any waiver '... is dependent upon it
being clear and unequivocal that the person is waiving the procedural
safeguard and is doing so with the full knowledge of the rights the proce-
dure was enacted to protect and of the effect the waiver will have on
those rights in the process.' "(emphasis in original)
Too often, the duty of those in authority to advise someone of his or
her right to counsel is merely given lip service. To his detriment, that
happened to Mr. Ictensev.
34. (1987), 76 N.R. 198 at 206 (S.C.C.).
35. Supra, note 5.
36 (1986). 66 N.R. 114 at 126 (S.C.C.).
